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Learn IAM

AI Agent Tool Authorization

AI Agent Tool Authorization

AI agents turn “a user clicked a button” into “a model executed a tool call.”

That changes authorization in two ways:

  1. the actor might be an agent (not directly a human)
  2. the agent might chain tools and services, expanding blast radius

This topic focuses on keeping AI automation least-privileged, auditable, and revocable.

Define the actor(s)

An “agent action” often involves multiple principals:

  • the end user (who requested the work)
  • the agent identity (the runtime doing the work)
  • tool/service identities (connectors)

Your system should be able to answer: “Which principal caused this write?”

Practical patterns

Tool-scoped tokens

Instead of giving the agent a broad user token:

  • mint a token scoped to one tool
  • scope it to one tenant/org
  • expire it quickly

Approval gates

For high-risk actions:

  • require explicit approval (human-in-the-loop)
  • record the approval as part of the audit trail

Capability allowlists

Give agents a small menu of allowed actions:

  • read-only by default
  • narrow write permissions with safeguards

Pitfalls

  • Treating the agent as a “super-admin”.
  • Not logging the prompt/tool context needed to explain actions.
  • No “kill switch” (revoke agent credentials, disable tools, invalidate tokens).

Where to go next